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THE DEATH PENALTY, EXTRADITION,
AND THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM:
U.S. RESPONSES TO EUROPEAN OPINION
ABOUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Kathryn F. King*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 2002, five men went on trial in Frankfurt, Germany,
charged with conspiring to blow up a Christmas market in Strasbourg,
France, on New Year's Day, 2001.1 Had the plot succeeded, it would have
cost innocent lives and destroyed a fourteenth century masterpiece of
Gothic architecture, the Cathedral of Notre Dame. But the plot failed. Ger-
man police, alerted by French authorities, raided a number of Frankfurt
apartments which had been under surveillance for nearly a year, and found
bomb-making materials, detonation devices, automatic Scorpion rifles,
forged identity papers, and a homemade video of the Cathedral of Notre
Dame and the busy marketplace adjoining it.2
The trial will determine the guilt or innocence of five defendants
who are charged in connection with the conspiracy.' As the trial pro-
gresses, prosecutors expect evidence to show links among the alleged con-
spirators, their Britain-based organization (Al Tawhid), and Osama bin
Laden's terrorist organization, Al Qaeda. Perhaps more importantly, the
trial will give the world strong evidence of just how truly global the reaches
* Kathryn F. King is an instructor of history and law studies and coach of mock
trial at Hampden Academy in Hampden, Maine. She spent the 2001-2002 aca-
demic year on sabbatical leave at the University of Maine School of Law, Portland,
Maine, studying constitutional law, international and comparative law, and criminal
law. Thanks to Professor Martin A. Rogoff of the University of Maine School of
Law for his support and direction during the research and writing of this article.
I Erik Schelzig & Peter Finn, Repentant Algerian Tells of Bomb Plot; Muslim
Militant, 'Horrified' by Sept. 11, Says His Target Was French Synagogue, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at A22. See also Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged:
Terror Network; Germans Try 5 Algerians Accused of Plotting French Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A12.
2 Schelzig & Finn, supra note 1.
3 Edmund L. Andrews, MidEast Turmoil: Investigations; German Officials Find
More Terrorist Groups, and Some Disturbing Parallels, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002,
at A12.
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of the Al Qaeda network, and other terrorist groups like it, are.4  Al
Tawhid's leader, Abu Musaab Zarqawi, is also a top Al Qaeda figure and is
believed to be hiding in Iran. The five defendants are all Algerians, were
trained in terrorist tactics in Afghanistan, and had practiced their skills in
teams in Bosnia and Pakistan. Financing for their German cell appears to
have come from international drug trafficking and credit card fraud. Docu-
ments forged in Thailand allowed the purchase of the bomb-making chemi-
cals. 5 At least one of the alleged Strasbourg conspirators has been linked
with Zacarias Moussaoui, who is currently on trial in United States federal
court in connection with the September 11 attacks, and who also appears to
be connected to Richard Reid, the Briton charged with trying to detonate
explosives in his shoes on a transatlantic flight. In addition to the five de-
fendants being tried in Germany, four additional conspirators are in cus-
tody in France; and the alleged mastermind of the plot, Abu Doha, is in
custody in Britain. The United States is seeking the extradition of Abu
Doha to face charges in a foiled plot to bomb the Los Angeles International
Airport on New Year's Day, 2000.6
The request for Doha's extradition is only one of many instances
post-September 11 in which the United States has found itself in pressing
need of cooperation from European governments to further the urgent na-
tional interest of combating international terrorism, by finding, arresting,
and bringing to trial those responsible for the attacks on New York City's
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. American need for European coop-
eration has made untenable - practically, if not philosophically - an iso-
lationist approach to foreign policy, and has raised broad, interesting
questions about ways in which the United States government may have to
reconfigure its practices in order to preserve the European cooperation upon
which we currently rely, and on which we will continue to rely, in the fight
against international terrorism and international crime in general. One par-
ticularly interesting question is, to what degree will European opinion effect
change in America's use of capital punishment?
Based on past practice, the answer to that question would appear to
be none. The United States government's positions on a number of foreign
policy issues have drawn sharp criticism from the European press and polit-
ical leadership. 7 However, according to Felix Rohatyn, former ambassador
4 Ian Johnson, Trial May Illuminate Al Qaeda's Modus Operandi, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 16, 2002, at A19.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Areas of contentiousness between the United States and Europe include trade
policies, environmental protection, promotion of peace in the Middle East, Ameri-
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to France during the Clinton administration, no single issue during his years
in France evoked as much controversy or as much passion as did executions
in the United States.8  The friction is generated essentially by the belief
common to European governments (expressed in both domestic law and
supranational agreements) that executions are contrary to human rights
norms, 9 as opposed to the position of the U.S. government. The U.S. gov-
ernment positions itself, through its constitution and laws, and generally
through its international human rights agreements, as a champion of human
rights; however, in treaties involving the death penalty, the U.S. Senate en-
cumbers international human rights treaties with reservations that allow
America to persist in the use of a punishment banned by European
democracies.10
A majority of American states as well as the federal government
use capital punishment;II in fact, Congress has recently expanded the cir-
can abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the United States'
"unsigning" of the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. Todd S.
Purdum, A Wider Atlantic: Europe Sees a Grotesque U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2002, at A3. See also EUROWATCH, Sept. 16, 1996, Commission Proposes Re-
sponse to U.S. Cuba Legislation; American Firms That Sue Could Face Retaliation
in the EU; EUROWATCH, May 2, 1997, USTR Critical of EU in Annual Trade Re-
port, Citing Wide Range of Issues; and 2002 RAPID, May 3, 2002, Joint Press Con-
ference with U.S. President George Bush, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria
Aznar, and European Commission President Romano Prodi.
8 A World Shift from Execution, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, June 8, 2001, at
Worldl. See also Europe's View of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001,
at A4.
9 Richard C. Dieter, International Perspectives on the Death Penalty: A Costly
Isolation for the U.S., DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR (1999), available at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreignnatl.html. Mr. Dieter, Executive Director for the
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), describes in his report ways in which the
international community has sought to limit the application of the death penalty
(for example, the European Convention on Human Rights), and the U.S. response
to these initiatives. His report also describes the international trend toward com-
plete abolition of the death penalty and the U.S. reaction to that trend. Finally, his
report notes the present and potential costs to the United States for persisting in the
use of capital punishment.
10 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1176 (1993). See
also Dieter, supra note 9.
11 Richard C. Dieter, Changes in the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html.
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cumstances in which capital punishment may be imposed. 12 In ratifying
international human rights agreements which include restrictions on the use
of capital punishment, the United States Senate has historically attached
reservations or concerns that are highly controversial and arguably invalid,
because they appear to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaties. 13 Supreme Court decisions, particularly those made over the last
25 years, have declined to declare the death penalty unconstitutional. 14 With
reference to the subject of this article, the court appears to lack a "decent
respect for the opinions of mankind"15 in its refusal to apply international
human rights norms regarding the death penalty to American capital
appeals. 16
12 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 848 (1988). See also Federal
Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000).
13 See, e.g., U.S. Reservation to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13, at 175. See also the
U.S. Reservation to the Covenant's Article 7, restricting the reach of the article to
that of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause in the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which limits the Human Rights Committee to consider-
ing whether death row incarceration in the United States violates the United States'
own constitutional standards.
14 William Hauptman, Lethal Reflections: New York's New Death Penalty and
Victim Impact Statements, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 439, 446-48 (1997) (trac-
ing the history of death penalty jurisprudence in the United States and reviewing
the holdings of Coker v. Georgia (433 U.S. 584 (1977)), Furman v. Georgia (408
U.S. 238 (1972)), and Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153 (1976)): respectively, that
the death penalty is an unconstitutionally excessive punishment for rape; that death
penalty statutes which cannot reasonably prevent juries from arbitrarily or capri-
ciously imposing capital punishment are unconstitutional; but that the death penalty
itself is not per se unconstitutional.) For an analysis of a number of controversies
surrounding the use of capital punishment, including the use of capital punishment
worldwide and the connections among international human rights law and Ameri-
can law, see HUGH ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES (1997 ed.).
15 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (United States, 1776).
16 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
380 (1989), stated,
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their vari-
ous amici ... that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant. While the 'practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice
uniform among our people is not merely an historical accident,
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However, analysis of two trends, together with an analysis of the
United States' actions at the procedural "window" of international extradi-
tion in our criminal justice system,' 7 argue for a more nuanced response.
The trend toward globalization that has gained much momentum since the
end of World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War, in-
cludes a dark aspect of increased multinational crime, which has heightened
state and international interests in obtaining jurisdiction over defendants
whom governments wish to prosecute, convict, and perhaps execute.
Thus, bilateral extradition treaties setting forth the terms and conditions by
which a requesting government may obtain jurisdiction over a suspect have
proliferated.' 8 Globalization also includes the happier trend toward a
strengthening worldwide commitment to the identification and enforcement
of international human rights norms. International agreements codifying
human rights norms, such as the European Convention on Human Rights19
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 20 have been
negotiated, signed, and ratified by a growing number of countries, consist-
ently narrowing or completely abolishing the use of capital punishment;
corresponding judicial or quasi-judicial institutions such as the European
Court of Human Rights construe and enforce the provisions of these
agreements.21
Because of the fundamentally different goals of human rights pro-
tection and criminal prosecutions, conflicts of laws questions have arisen.
The issue of America's use of capital punishment has more and more fre-
quently been at the center of those conflicts. For example, when the United
but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it
occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in
our Constitution as well'. . . they cannot serve to establish the
first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted
among our people.
17 1 want to thank Professor Melvyn Zarr of the University of Maine School of
Law for the concept of viewing substantive law through actions at "procedural
windows", or stages, in the judicial process.
18 See generally, IGOR 1. KAVASS, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN
FORCE (2000 ed.).
19 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept.
3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M 368 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976,
adopted by the United States Sept.8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
21 ECHR, supra note 19, at art. 19.
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States requests, pursuant to a valid extradition treaty, that the British For-
eign Office extradite a detainee to stand trial in America for a capital of-
fense, to which law must the British government conform its response: To
its own national law, which prohibits the death penalty? To its extradition
treaty with the United States? To the requirements of the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
is considered binding on member states and includes a prohibition of capital
punishment? 22 The answer in Europe to those questions is generally that
the language and fundamental principles of international human rights
agreements must direct the manner in which an international agreement
such as an extradition treaty is executed. The answer to such questions in
America generally has been the opposite: The United States government
has declined to conform its behavior to international standards where doing
so would result in diminution of state sovereignty and supremacy of statu-
tory and constitutional law.23 But by degrees, over the past fifteen years
and particularly since the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and New York
City's World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, the U.S. govern-
ment's refusal to consider European opinion on capital punishment as a
violation of human rights has weakened. America's changed position is
particularly visible in its actions at the procedural window of international
extradition.
This article is not an analysis of the moral, ethical, or legal argu-
ments for or against the use of capital punishment. Rather, it examines the
relationship between European opinion about the death penalty and pros-
pects for American use of capital punishment in the future. Part II briefly
reviews the death penalty's abolition in Europe through national and inter-
national practice, and contrasts that with the use of capital punishment in
the United States at the state and federal level. Part III explores the tradi-
tional, positive law indicators of American response to European opposition
to capital punishment, including statutes, judicial opinions, and action with
regard to the negotiation and ratification of international agreements, and
compliance with obligations under such agreements. Part IV analyzes the
outcomes of international extradition conflicts between the United States
and various European governments in civil and analogous military contexts,
and suggests that those outcomes collectively constitute an expanding,
functional inroad into American use of capital punishment - an inroad cre-
22 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/
Res/44/128, E.T.S. No. 114, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990) (entered into force
Julyl1, 1991), at art.1 [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol].
23 Bassiouni, supra note 10, at 1169.
DEATH PENALTY EXTRADITION
ated in direct response to European opinion. Finally, Part V suggests that,
in light of pressing state concerns, the functional inroad will become more,
not less significant in the future.
II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
A. European Practice
For all intents and purposes, the death penalty no longer exists in
Western Europe. The extreme human rights abuses of the Second World
War exercised what has been called "a strong humanizing and restraining
influence on European politics. '24 "While the tear was in the eye" from the
experiences of World War II, the newly formed General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which proclaimed without qualification that everyone has the right
to life.25 In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of international human rights
treaties were drafted, including the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR) 26 and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).27 Like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ICCPR
and the ECHR explicitly affirmed the right to life, but allowed for narrow
use of capital punishment as an exception that could be employed only in
very limited circumstances. 28 Despite the fact that those treaties allowed
limited use of the death penalty, many Western European nations simply
stopped using it, even if they did not technically abolish it.29 Thus, by the
1980s de facto abolition of capital punishment was the norm in Western
Europe.
Since the 1980s, additional international human rights agreements
have been drafted and ratified with the goal of making abolition of capital
punishment an international norm. Most notably, those agreements include
24 Martin A. Rogoff, European Integration: Past, Present, and Future, 33 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1305, 1307 (2000).
25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
26 ICCPR, supra note 20.
27 ECHR, supra note 19.
28 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 20, arts. 3, 6, and 7; and ECHR, supra note 19,
arts. 2 and 3.
29 History of the Death Penalty, Part IL-Limiting the Death Penalty
(D.P.I.C.), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/history-3.html#
TheDeathPenaltyToday. See alsoFrance's Loi No. 81-908 du Octobre 1981, the
first article of which abolished the death penalty in France, available at http://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/frame-lois-reglt.htm
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should be made by the country itself. '3 7 She continues, ". . .neither the
quantity nor the type of human rights abuses, nor whether the abuses have
already been documented by previous efforts, will determine the suitability
or prescribability of official truth-seeking. A relatively small number of
cases does not lessen the urgency of the issue. Instead, the primary measure
to determine the importance of a truth commission is found in the desire for
a truth-seeking process from within the society under question. It is hard to
measure these sentiments in concrete terms... Opinion polls are unrealistic
in most countries, and fear of speaking publicly about government abuses
may continue long after... the departure of a repressive regime. Although
there may be no means of formal measurement... governments should...
be guided by expressed national preferences, especially those of the victims
or groups that represent them. In those countries where there is a genera-
lized lack of interest in or resistance to digging up the past, this is likely to
be reflected at all political and societal levels: a preference for letting go, an
uncomfortableness in talking of the past.. .Elsewhere, the demand for truth
and accountability is made clear through public demonstrations, lobbying
from victims or human rights organizations...",3
Other reasons why a Truth Commission should be established are that it
can:
39
Help establish the truth about the past: Professor Makau Mutua
writes, "Another function, which is probably the most important one,
is that of truth telling, where the perpetrators bare all, and the vic-
tims recount the horrors visited upon them by the sadism of the
state."'40 "The ultimate goal of the truth commission, in fact its
raison d'etre, is the search for truth," writes Charles Manga Fombad,
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Botswana. Alex
Boraine observes that, "one of the major advantages of a truth com-
mission...is...inclusive truth telling. '41 He proceeds to categorize
these as the objective or factual or forensic truth; the personal or
37 Id. at 186.
38 Id. at 201.
39 Freeman & Hayner, supra note 4 at 125-26; see also David A. Crocker, Truth
Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE
MORAL EFFICACY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 99 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
Thompson eds., 2000); Charles Manga Fombad, Peace Builidng Through Truth
Commissions in Africa, (unpublished article on file with author).
40 Mutua, supra note 6, at 3.
41 Boraine, supra note 21, at 291.
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narrative truth; the social or dialogical truth; and the healing and
restorative truth.42
Writer Michael Ignatieff states: "The past is an argument and the function
of truth commissions, like the function of honest historians, is simply to
purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies."143 The aim
here is for the truth commission to establish an "accurate record of a coun-
try's past, clarify uncertain events, and lift the lid of silence and denial from
a contentious and painful period of history." 44 It establishes "a record of the
past that is accurate, detailed, impartial and official. This record can serve
to counter the fictitious or exaggerated accounts of the past that were propa-
gated by the previous regime. . .and bring the true scale and impact of a
violent past to the public consciousness." 45
In this regard, it may not even be telling a new truth, rather it may be
acknowledging or formally recognizing a truth that may be generally well
known that is critical, especially where official denial was pervasive.
In Chile, survivors cite a public apology by the state during an emotional
appeal for pardon and forgiveness by the President when releasing the Chil-
ean truth report to the public as "a powerful moment after having their
claims brushed aside for so many years.146 Molly Andrews notes that, "the
power of truth commissions lies not so much in discovering the truth - in
the form of new facts - as in acknowledging it. ' 47
Promote the accountability of perpetrators of human rights vio-
lations: The evidence collected by a truth commission could be used
in subsequent prosecutions, or to recommend other sanctions such as
civil liability, removal from office, restitution or community service.
An example of a country where evidence gathered by a Truth Com-
mission has been instrumental in this regard is Argentina where it
was used to quickly build cases against nine senior members of the
previous regime.48 It should also be noted that, "Baltasar Garzon,
the Spanish judge who brought charges against Augusto Pinochet,
42 Id. at 288-92.
43 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 25 (citing Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, 25
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 110, 113 (1996).
44 Id. at 24-25
45 Freeman & Hayner, supra note 4, at 125.
46 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 26.
47 Andrews, supra note 11, at 49.
48 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 93.
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plication to set aside national legislative provisions which
might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from
having full force and effect are incompatible with those re-
quirements, which are the very essence of Community
law. . . . It must be added that the full effectiveness of
Community law would be just as much impaired if a rule of
national law could prevent a court from granting interim
relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of a judgment
to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under
Community law. It follows that a court which in those cir-
cumstances would grant interim relief, if it were not for a
rule of national law, is obliged to set aside that rule.43
Thus, the court concluded, if the UK court would find it useful or necessary
to grant interim relief in order to secure rights under Community law, that
court (more broadly, a court in any member state) is obliged to set aside a
national rule prohibiting such relief.44 In response to the court's ruling,
Lord Bridge of the House of Lords, with reasoning reminiscent of that in
Vabre, wrote:
Under the terms of the European Communities Act of 1972
it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United
Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to over-
ride any rule of national law found to be in conflict with
any directly enforceable rule of Community law ... Thus,
there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy
to rules of Community law in those areas to which they
apply and to insist that, in the protection of rights under
Community law, national courts must not be inhibited by
rules of national law from granting interim relief in appro-
priate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that
supremacy. 45
In Golder,46 a case referred in 1975 by the government of the
United Kingdom to the ECHR, a complaint was made by an inmate in a
British prison that prison rules made pursuant to an act of Parliament (the
Prison Act of 1952) violated his rights under the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ECHR held that the
43 Factortame (ECJ), supra note 42, at I - 2473-74.
44 Factortame (ECJ), supra note 42.
45 Factortame (UK), supra note 37, at 108.
46 Golder, supra note 38.
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prison rules and their execution constituted a breach of Articles 6 and 8 of
the Convention; the British government subsequently changed its rules to
comply with the Court's decision. 47  Together, Vabre and Factortame
show the willingness of member states of the EU to pass to the Union some
attributes of national sovereignty; read with Golder, those cases show a
commitment by European nations to do so in the interest of protection of
human rights.
Today, all members of the European Union have banned the death
penalty. Abolition has been made a prerequisite for EU membership, giv-
ing Eastern and Central European nations who desire to join the EU strong
incentives to prohibit the practice. 48 In principle and in practice, Western
European governments are unequivocally opposed to capital punishment.
49
B. American Practice
Since 1948, the U.S. has been a leader in the development of
human rights norms; its influence is unmatched by any other country. 50
U.S. constitutional terms and principles were incorporated into the "Interna-
tional Bill of Rights," the collective term for three major human rights in-
struments - the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, 1 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,52 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.53 But to the dismay and immense
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Turkish Parliament, Looking to Europe, Passes Reforms, N.Y. TIMES,
August 4, 2002, at A12. See also Daniel Simpson, Turks May Face Long Road to
the European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at A12 (discussing the Turkish
Parliament's abolition of the death penalty and adoption of other human rights re-
forms as part of Turkey's campaign for EU membership).
49 See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1997). Professor Schabas describes the articulation
and evolution of international norms limiting the death penalty within the United
Nations and international humanitarian law; he also analyzes evolving, expanding
regional standards, both within the Council of Europe and the Organization of
American States.
50 Bassiouni, supra note 10, at 1169.
51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res, 217A(III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
52 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, Annex to G.A.Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), at
490.
53 ICCPR, supra note 20.
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is akin to therapy. It can perform the function of moral reconstruc-
tion, in which a country takes stock of its morality in politics, gov-
ernance, cultural values and its view of humanity. Moral
reconstruction implies learning lessons from the past and revising
the nation's moral code. It could be a vehicle for reconciliation after
truth and justice have been told and done. Here, society must pass
judgment on what it has heard; it must, in effect, establish a moral
account of the historical record. '57 The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in South Africa had, at its public hearings, "a huge sign
hung behind the panel of commissioners that read, Truth: The Road
to Reconciliation. Posters promoting the commission coaxed, "Let's
speak out to each other. By telling the truth. By telling our stories
of the past, so that we can walk the road to reconciliation." '58 As we
shall see later, however, achieving this aim remains contentious, and
an issue that requires deep reflection.
Help consolidate democratic transition: A truth commission could
"signal a formal break with a dark and violent past, and the transition
to a more open, peaceful and democratic future. If they are success-
ful, truth commissions can have the effect of weakening anti-demo-
cratic actors who might otherwise continue to pursue their goals
outside the democratic process. '59
In the introduction of the Report of the Chilean National Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation, Commission member Jose Zalaquett summarizes
the importance of a truth commission, thus: "[t]he truth [is]considered as an
absolute, unrenounceable value for many reasons. In order to provide for
measures of reparation and prevention, it must be clearly known what it is
that ought to be repaired and prevented. Further, society cannot simply
black out a chapter of its history, however differently the facts may be inter-
preted. The void would be filled with lies or with conflicting versions. The
unity of a nation depends upon a shared identity, which, in turn depends
largely on a shared memory. The truth also brings a measure of social
catharsis and helps to prevent the past from recurring. In addition, bringing
the facts to light is, to some extent, a form of punishment, albeit mild, in
that it provokes social censure against the perpetrators or the institutions or
groups they belonged to. But although the truth cannot really in itself dis-
pense justice, it does put an end to many a continued injustice. It does not
57 Mutua, supra note 6, at 3.
58 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 156.
59 Freeman & Hayner, supra note 4, at 126-27.
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bring the dead back to life, but it brings them out of silence; for the families
of the 'disappeared', the truth about their fate would mean, at last, the end
of an anguishing, endless, search...,60
Conversely, a truth commission should not be established if the people do
not recommend it. Alex Boraine, the vice-chair of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission notes: "On the other hand, there are power-
ful voices that urge that the way to deal with the past is to forget and move
on. . .for many of them it is not a question of ignoring the atrocities that
have been committed so much as a concern to consolidate and protect our
newly emerging democracy. Of course, there are some who simply wish to
ignore the past because of their own involvement in it. But there is a defen-
sible position which calls for moving on into the future and not allowing the
past to destroy or inhibit the new democracy. 61
And Timothy Garton Ash observes: "There is profound insight of the histo-
rian Ernest Renan that every nation is a community both of shared memory
and shared forgetting. 'Forgetting,' writes Renan, 'and I would say even
historical error, is an essential factor in the history of a nation.' Histori-
cally, the advocates of forgetting are many and impressive. They range
from Cicero in 44 B.C., demanding just two days after Caesar's murder that
the memory of past discord be consigned to 'eternal oblivion,' to Winston
Churchill in his Zurich speech 2000 years later, recalling Gladstone's ap-
peal for a 'blessed act of oblivion between former enemies.' "62
Yale University Professor Bruce Ackerman also says that "moral capital" is
better spent in educating the population of the limits of the law rather than
in engaging in a "quixotic quest after the mirage of corrective justice." He
cautions that any attempts at corrective justice will generate "the perpetua-
tion of moral arbitrariness and the creation of a new generation of victims
because of the inevitable deviations from due process that would attach to
trials., 63
Hayner 64 commits a whole chapter of her book discussing this issue (titled
"Leaving the Past Alone) and uses the cases of Mozambique and Cambodia
60 Jos6 Zalaquett, Introduction to REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, xxiii, xxxi (Phillip E. Berryman trans.,
1993).
61 BORAINE, supra note 21, at 4.
62 Ash, supra note 20.
63 Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
64 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 183-205.
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When the United States has approved the treaty [the
ICCPR] in 1992, it specifically reserved the right:
subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose
capital punishment
on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly
convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of
capital punishment
for crimes committed by persons below eighteen
years of age...
Finally, we note that even if the agreement were to ban the
imposition of the death penalty, [it] is [not] binding on fed-
eral courts. 'Courts in the United States are bound to give
effect to international law and to international agreements,
except that a non-self-executing agreement will not be
given the same effect as law in the absence of necessary
authority.' [T]he International Covenant is [not] self-exe-
cuting, nor has Congress enacted implementing legislation
for [it].69
Just three years earlier, Michael Domingues challenged his death
sentence in the State Supreme Court in Nevada. 70 In that case, Domingues,
who was convicted and sentenced to die for two murders committed when
he was sixteen years old, moved for a correction of what he asserted was an
illegal sentence. 71 In his motion, Domingues argued that the execution of
juveniles violates both customary international law as well as Article 6 of
the ICCPR. 72 The Supreme Court of Nevada, like the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, held that because the U.S. Senate ratified the ICCPR with an ex-
press reservation to Article 6, this provision of the treaty does not supersede
69 Id., at 372
70 Domingues v. State of Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998).
71 Id.
72 Id.
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state law, regardless of the object and purpose of the treaty.73 The U.S.
Supreme Court subsequently denied Domingues' certiorari request.74
In American executions of foreign nationals there is further evi-
dence of disregard for international opinion about capital punishment. The
United States has been a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions since ratifying it in 1969,75 and has expressed no reservation to Article
36 of the Convention which requires an arresting authority to notify without
delay an alien of his or her right to consular access, and to permit contact
with the consul if requested.76 However, U.S. officials have consistently
ignored Article 36 with regard to treatment of foreign nationals on Ameri-
can soil.77 This failure, which constitutes a clear violation of international
law, has been unsuccessfully litigated in a number of U.S. death penalty
cases.
78
73 Id. Writing for the Nevada Supreme Court, Justice Young explained:
Domingues contends that pursuant to the ICCPR, imposition of
the death penalty on one who committed a capital offense while
under the age of eighteen is illegal. Although the United States
Senate ratified the ICCPR with a reservation allowing juvenile
offenders to be sentenced to death, Domingues asserts that this
reservation was invalid and thus this capital sentencing prohibi-
tion set forth in the treaty is the supreme law of the land. Dom-
ingues contends that his death sentence, imposed for crimes he
committed when he was sixteen years old, is thereby facially in-
valid. We disagree. We conclude that the Senate's express reser-
vation of the United States' right to impose a penalty of death on
juvenile offenders negates Domingues' claim that he was ille-
gally sentenced. Many of our sister jurisdictions have laws au-
thorizing the death penalty for criminal offenders under the age
of eighteen, and such laws have withstood Constitutional scrutiny
.... [W]e affirm the decision of the district court denying Dom-
ingues' motion to correct the sentence.
74 Domingues v. Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (1999).
75 Vienna Convention, supra note 55.
76 Vienna Convention, supra note 55, at art. 36(b)(1).
77 Richard Dieter, The U.S. Death Penalty and International Law: U.S. Compli-
ance with the Torture and Race Conventions, Remarks at the Ford Foundation
Symposium on the U.S. Death Penalty and International Law (Nov., 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DPICstatements.html#torture.
78 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998). See also, Federal Re-
public of Germany et al. v. United States et al., 526 U.S. 111 (1999); Ledezma v.
Iowa, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001), citing other recent, unsuccessfully litigated
Article 35 cases. Id. at 151.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The task force has engaged in a timely and useful exercise of public hear-
ings to gauge whether or not Kenyans desire a truth commission. Based on
its reading of the public mood, the task force is therefore fairly able to
recommend whether Kenyans are agreeable to a truth commission or not.
Notably, after evaluating the examples of Mozambique and Cambodia, it is
clear that their history has been characterized by internecine civil war; a
phenomenon that, thankfully, did not happen in Kenya, which has a history
of successive authoritarian regimes. In this regard, one would agree with
the following excerpt from Unspeakable Truths:69
Indeed, there are some examples around the world that seem to confirm the
danger of allowing a country or its government the option of simply ignor-
ing the legacy of past state crimes. African rights expert Richard Carver
argues persuasively that several countries in Africa have suffered from such
a policy, and that there have been clear negative long-term consequences
from failing to come to terms with the past. For example, in Malawi, some
of the repressive patterns of the past, such as laws allowing censorship,
have received support from those who used to oppose them under the old
regime. If these laws and the effects that they have "were properly exposed
to public view, the repressive tendencies would still be there, but there
would be greater public will to resist them," says Carver.
Let us now turn to the specific questions regarding the formation of truth
commissions.
1. How is a Truth Commission Formed?
Of the 21 truth commissions documented in Unspeakable Truths,70 12 were
created through executive decree (President, Prime Minister or Ministry of
Government and Police), FOUR were created through the legislature (al-
though in Sierra Leone there had been an earlier agreement to form it
through the peace accord), THREE were arrived at through the avenue of the
United Nations, and TWO were formed by an independent political entity
(the African National Congress - ANC - in South Africa).
A truth commission can be formed in Kenya through two visibly contend-
ing avenues. As Professor Makau Mutua has observed, "there are two pos-
sible routes for the establishment of a truth commission. The commission
69 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 184.
70 Id. at 305-11.
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could to be established either as an independent organ by an act of parlia-
ment or through a presidential order under the powers granted him by the
Constitution. 71
But the use of either of these methods will have different effects, which the
Task Force needs to consider. As Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner ob-
serve, "in many countries, the way in which a truth commission is created
will have a direct effect on what its powers can be. For example, in demo-
cratic countries with presidential or semi-presidential forms of governance,
the executive branch of government usually cannot, on its own, confer
search and seizure or even subpoena powers, which tends to be the exclu-
sive preserve of the legislative branch. The same may also be true with
respect to powers of reporting, including the question of whether the com-
mission can make binding recommendations. Similarly, who establishes
the commission can affect the allocation of funding, since one branch of
government may have greater access to resources and a greater commitment
to the commission's work. '72
Appointment by the President would be through the Commissions of In-
quiry Act, Chapter 102 of the Laws of Kenya. The purpose of this Act is
"to provide for the appointment of commissioners to inquire into and report
on matters of a public nature referred to them by the President, to prescribe
their powers, privileges and duties, and to provide for other matters relating
thereto." To achieve this objective, the President is vested with powers to
issue a commission to a commissioner or commissioners to inquire "into
any matter into which an inquiry would, in the opinion of the President, be
in the public interest. ' 73 It is also provided that "every commission shall
direct how the commission shall be executed. '74
The greatest strength of establishing a truth commission in this manner is
that it fulfils the need for timeliness, which arises under the question of
when a truth commission should be formed (tackled below). As we shall
see when considering this question, the recommended and appropriate time
to form a truth commission is immediately.
A truth commission that is established under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act "shall have the powers of the High Court to summon witnesses, and to
71 Mutua, supra note 6, at 4.
72 Freeman & Hayner, supra note 4, at 129.
73 Commissions of Inquiry Act, § 3(1), Chapter 102 of the Laws of Kenya.
74 Section 3 (3) of Chapter 102 of the Laws of Kenya
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tionality of specific statutes. 88 Because Furman did not deem the death
penalty per se unconstitutional, retentionist states and Congress could (and
did) cure the procedural flaws in their capital punishment statutes, allowing
executions to proceed. 89
Since the reinstatement of capital punishment in the U.S., some
limitations on its use have been imposed. The Supreme Court in 1977 ruled
that capital punishment is excessive, thus cruel and unusual, when imposed
for the rape of an adult woman when the victim was not killed.90 Eleven
years later, the court ruled executions of the legally insane unconstitu-
tional.9 1 Five states since 2001 have banned execution of the mentally re-
tarded; one state has formally declared a moratorium on death sentences,
with another state experiencing a de facto moratorium while its state su-
preme court evaluates the constitutionality of its death penalty statute.92
Nine states and the federal government are currently conducting studies
about their respective death penalty practices. 93
Notwithstanding these changes, however, the death penalty appears
firmly entrenched in American criminal justice. Retentionist states seem
88 Furman, supra note 86. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan wrote, "In sum, the
punishment of death is inconsistent with all four principles [by which it may be
determined whether a punishment is cruel and unusual] .... The function of these
principles is to enable a court to determine whether a punishment comports with
human dignity. Death, quite simply, does not." Id. at 305. Also concurring, Jus-
tice Marshall wrote, "There is but one conclusion that can be drawn from all of this
- i.e., the death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates
the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 358-59.
89 Dieter, supra note 11.
90 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Justice White, writing for the Court,
concluded that the sentence of death for the crime of rape is "grossly disproportion-
ate and excessive punishment.., and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment as cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 592. Justice White explained that
although rape deserves serious punishment, the death penalty, which is unique in its
severity and irrevocability, is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does
not take human life. Id. at 598
91 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
92 Dieter, supra notell.
93 The Death Penalty: Latest Developments and Trends (American Bar Associa-
tion, May 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/irrf/deathpenalty/latesttrend.
html. See also Pam Belluck, Vermont Judge Calls Capital Punishment Law Un-
constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at A14; and Benjamin Wieser, U.S.
Challenges Ruling Against Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at C23, for
examples of very recent controversy among federal justices and United States pros-
ecutors with regard to the constitutionality of the death penalty.
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interested in minimizing the potential for excessiveness and violations of
due process in the use of capital punishment, but uninterested in banning its
use. For example, Florida, while adopting heightened standards for the lead
attorneys in capital cases and banning the execution of the mentally re-
tarded, had on its general election ballot for November, 2002, a proposal to
reduce the minimum age for execution of juveniles to sixteen years. 9 4
New York's state legislature in September of 2001 enacted an anti-terror-
ism law that expanded circumstances under which the death penalty may be
used.95 Texas's governor, while signing into law the "Texas Fair Defense
Act" (which among other things increased state funding for defense counsel
and criminal defense investigations for indigent defendants), vetoed a bill to
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded. One legislator in Texas has
proposed allowing the execution of offenders as young as 11.96
Despite two recent Supreme Court holdings, there is strong evi-
dence that the use of capital punishment at the federal as well as the state
level is firmly entrenched. On June 20, 2002, asserting a "national consen-
sus against it," the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that execution of the mentally
retarded is unconstitutional. 97 Four days later, the court also ruled unconsti-
tutional a capital punishment sentencing scheme that would allow a sen-
tencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance
necessary for imposition of the death penalty.98 However, the court's rul-
ings left undisturbed the status of capital punishment as generally constitu-
tional.99 The court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
the execution of juveniles who were as young as sixteen years old when
they committed their offenses. 1°° And, with respect to the question of
whether an international trend to abolish the death penalty for juveniles
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See also, Linda Greenhouse, The Su-
preme Court: The Death Penalty; Citing 'National Consensus,' Justices Bar Death
Penalty for Retarded Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002, at Al; and Peter
Edidin, The Nation; Death Row: Faces Behind a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2002, at D14.
98 Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
99 Another Death Penalty Ruling, N. Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at A24. See also
Adam Liptak and Sara Rimer, The Supreme Court: The State Laws; With Little
Guidance, States Face Hard Debate on Who is Retarded, N.Y. Times, June 21,
2002, at Al, for commentary on some of the procedural consequences of the Atkins
decision.
100 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 380 (1989).
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verely curtailed by Parliament as there is a considerable constituency within
Parliament that is clearly threatened by the formation of a truth commis-
sion. It should not escape the mind of the task force that when their inter-
ests have previously been similarly threatened, some Parliamentarians have
been as bold as to state that they would disable progressive legislation, as
happened at the National Constitutional Conference when delegates' sup-
port of a provision to recall members of parliament in the draft constitution
was met with a threat to withdraw legislative support. It is perhaps this
weakness that Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Kiraitu Murungi
was referring to when he lamented that "there are inherent structural limita-
tions to radical reform in Kenya" as he opened the workshop organized by
the task force titled: "A Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission For
Kenya: Prospects and Obstacles on 4 July 2003.
Recommendation: Exercising Presidential Power under the Commissions of
Inquiry Act is the way to go. There does not seem to be an intention in the
current Presidency to interfere with the working of independent institutions
and there is clear goodwill emanating from this office. In relation to the
independence of the commission, it should be provided in its establishment
that the truth commission shall not be subject to direction from any individ-
ual, institution or group.
2. When Should a Truth Commission be Formed?
It is clear that this should be undertaken immediately. Makau Mutua notes
that "Kenya must establish a truth commission this year."'79 He continues:
"Truth commissions are created principally at the time of a state's transition
toward a more democratic or participatory government, a government that
espouses the ideals of democracy, of power bounded by law, of formal legal
equality, and social justice. It matters not how the moment of political
change occurred; it could have been violent or non-violent, such as Ke-
nya's. What matters is that there is a normative and substantive departure
by the successor government or state from its predecessor. Thus it could be
change from autocracy to democracy, from opacity to transparency, from
open shameless graft to fiscal and economic accountability. But that
change must be structural, ideological, and fundamental, it cannot be a con-
tinuation of the same, the change must signal real and genuine regime
change."80 Indeed, it should be noted that a defining characteristic that
serves to define a truth commission is that it is, "usually created at a point
79 Mutua, supra note 6, at 4.
80 Id. at 2.
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of political transition, either from war to peace or from authoritarian rule to
democracy. "81
Moreover, at the point of political transition, there is often times great sup-
port for change and this can be used to create an environment that helps
uncover and unlock secrets that have been hidden in the caves of history. It
is instructive to look at, for example, the circumstances surrounding the
declassification of top state secret files regarding Goldenberg by Attorney-
General Amos Wako as widely reported by the media on June 18, 2003.
Clearly, there is a need to take advantage of such cusps of public goodwill
before they are eroded by political evolution. In this regard, Hayner ob-
serves: "Most countries are well served by a quick start to a truth commis-
sion. The political momentum and popular support for such an initiative are
generally highest at the point of transition, as a new government takes
power... and there is a narrow window to transform this momentum into
serious reforms, purges of human rights abusers, or reparations for victims.
A quick start to a truth commission can also have the secondary effect of
holding off pressure for immediate reforms and other measures of accounta-
bility, giving the government time to take stock, plan and strengthen institu-
tions as necessary to further its other transitional justice initiatives. '8 2
However, Hayner also points out an important exception to the "the quicker
the better" rule. "South Africa spent eighteen months designing its Truth
and Reconciliation Commission following democratic elections in 1994.
This preparatory time was crucial to developing the commission's complex
empowering legislation, to gain the backing from almost all political par-
ties, and to seek input from many outside observers through which the pro-
posed commission gained legitimacy. The Committee on Justice of the
South African Parliament held over 150 hours of public hearings on the
legislation, taking input from human rights organizations, victims, an asso-
ciation of former police officers, churches, and others. International human
rights groups made submissions critiquing the draft legislation. And fi-
nally, after the legislation was in place, the very public process of selecting
commissioners.. .added many months, but these steps greatly improved and
strengthened the commission."83
81 Freeman & Hayner, supra note 4, at 125.
82 HAYNER, supra note 3, at 221.
83 Id. at 221-22.
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Extradition is an area of international law that is closely connected
to the principle of state sovereignty. It is "the surrender by one state to
another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own
territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of another, which, being com-
petent to try and punish that individual, demands the surrender." 10 9 In short,
extradition is the mechanism by which states cooperate with each other by
agreeing to surrender fugitives to each other upon request.110 Customary
international law does not require that states extradite. However, most
states enter into bilateral extradition treaties, thereby voluntarily accepting
limitations on their sovereignty. Their willingness to do so stems from the
principal goals of international extradition: (1) to obtain reciprocal return
of fugitive offenders; (2) to effect punishment of wrongful conduct, thereby
promoting justice; (3) to avoid becoming safe havens for fugitives; and (4)
to avoid the international tensions caused by one country's refusal to return
a fugitive.'
As previously stated, the extradition process is generally embodied
in bilateral treaties and accompanying extradition statutes. Treaties set
forth inter-party procedures - that is, what procedural requirements a
country must meet, as well as that country's rights - in an extradition
proceeding. 112 Procedural provisions commonly include requirements for
how the accused is to be arrested, detained, and delivered. Treaties also
generally include substantive rights of a fugitive facing extradition, an enu-
meration of extraditable offenses, and a list of exceptions to the obligation
to extradite." 3 For example, a common exception included in extradition
treaties is a reciprocal clause allowing for the non-extradition of nationals
of the requested state. Also commonly included are capital punishment-
related exceptions and political offense exceptions which are designed to
protect political dissidents from being persecuted by national governments
displeased by their dissent."14
Whereas treaties address inter-party procedure, the American fed-
eral extradition statute allocates responsibility for extradition within the
109 Black's Law Dictionary 585 (6th ed. 1990).
110 Dina Maslow, Extradition from Israel: the Samuel Sheinbein Case, 7 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387, 388 (1999).
111 Matthew Henning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions
Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L. Rev. 347, 350-51
(1999).
112 See, e.g., Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 85 (2nd Cir. 2000).
113 Maslow, supra note 110, at 388.
114 Id.
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U.S. government to a judicial officer and the Secretary of State.1 15 Process-
ing an extradition request involves both the executive and judicial branches
of government, but is largely a matter of foreign policy controlled by a
state's executive power.116 When a foreign government seeks the extradi-
tion of an individual from the United States, it first submits a formal request
to the State Department supported by any documentation required by the
terms of the extradition treaty. If the request is approved by the State De-
partment and the Department of Justice, the request is forwarded to the
appropriate United States Attorney who files the request (generally with an
arrest warrant attached) with the local federal district court. Upon arrest,
the defendant appears for the first time before a federal magistrate or district
court judge, whose duty it is to determine whether the defendant is
extraditable.
At the extradition hearing, the judge first determines whether re-
quirements for extradition have been met - for example, whether or not
the offense with which the defendant is charged is one for which the treaty
permits extradition, or whether the evidence submitted to the court supports
a finding of probable cause that the defendant committed the offense al-
leged.117 The judge then may consider whether there are grounds for deny-
ing extradition. Bases for denial, such as a refusal to extradite a country's
own nationals, generally are explicit in a treaty. The magistrate's or judge's
ruling on the issue of extraditability is separate from the issue of whether
any other reasons exist for not extraditing the offender." 8 Should a defen-
dant anticipate unfair or abusive treatment following his extradition, he has
historically been allowed to seek relief on that ground only from the Secre-
tary of State because of the responsibility of that department for negotiation
and enforcement of treaties, and, more broadly, for foreign affairs.
In fact, both domestically and internationally, the existence of an
extradition treaty has traditionally triggered observance of the rule of judi-
cial non-inquiry. 119 Under this rule, a judge determining the extraditability
of a defendant declines to examine the fairness of the requesting country's
judicial and penal systems or to consider the possibility that a defendant
115 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186 (1948).
116 Henning, supra note 111, at 852.
117 Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases after Soering, 17 YALE J. INr'L L. 85, 87 (1992).
118 See id. at 89.
119 Mary B. MacDonald, Extradition Law - Supplementary Extradition Treaty
Between United States and United Kingdom - Interpreted as a Partial Abrogation
of the Rule of Non-Inquiry, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 391, 391 (1995).
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may be mistreated upon rendition to that country.120 A number of reasons
underpin this practice. One involves the "political question" doctrine,
under which courts do not consider issues that are more appropriately han-
dled by executive or legislative branches of government. With regard to the
issues of extradition and judicial non-inquiry, extradition is generally
viewed as a tool of foreign policy, which is an arena traditionally belonging
to heads of state, therefore inappropriate for judicial involvement. 121 A sec-
ond reason is that judicial review of the legal systems of states with differ-
ing ideologies allows notorious criminals to escape punishment. 122 Further,
a court's investigation of another nation's legal system to determine
whether human rights violations exist has been considered an infringement
upon that country's sovereignty and a violation of the international princi-
ple of comity. 123 The rule of judicial non-inquiry assumes that the quality
of justice in the receiving country was addressed in the original decision to
negotiate and ratify an extradition treaty with the country in question. That
is, courts have inferred from the existence of an extradition treaty mutual
faith by each of the ratifying governments in the other's judicial processes,
thereby rendering improper and unnecessary any further investigation in
that area. 124
Over the past fifty years, crime has become increasingly global-
ized.125 International money laundering schemes, nuclear and biological
weapons smuggling, international art thefts, and slavery all are examples of
criminal acts involving persons, contraband, and illegal profits crossing in-
ternational borders. 126 A 1998 indictment and subsequent trial of twenty-six
Mexican bankers and three Mexican banks for laundering drug money illus-
trates the nature of the complexity of international crime. The Mexican
scheme involved banks in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela, as well as south
Florida trading companies, in money laundering by Colombian drug car-
120 Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-
Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1198, 1198-
1200 (1991).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Mark E. DeWitt, Extradition Enigma: Italy and Human Rights versus America
and the Death Penally, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 535, 538 (1998).
124 MacDonald, supra note 119, at 401.
125 Rachel Van Cleave, The Role of U.S. Federal Courts in Extradition Matters:
The Rule of Non-Inquiry, Preventive Detention, and Comparative Legal Analysis,
13 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 27, 33 (1999).
126 Id.
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tels. 127 However, nothing in recent history so starkly illustrates the sophisti-
cation of a particularly lethal international crime - international terrorism
- as do the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the Pentagon and
New York City.
Osama bin Laden, the suspected mastermind of the September 11
attacks, has over the past ten years commanded his terrorist network's oper-
ations from a number of different countries, including Somalia and Afghan-
istan. 128 Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network functions in part as an umbrella
organization for other terrorist groups such as Al Jihad in Egypt, the Na-
tional Islamic Front in Sudan, and Hizbollah, a radical Islamic group with
ties to the Iranian government. 129 Al Qaeda has operated training camps
and guest houses in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Kenya; one of its
cells may have masterminded the plot, mentioned previously, to blow up
the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Strasbourg, France, in 2001.130 Mohammed
Atta, one of the alleged September 11 airline hijackers, was a truly a citizen
of the world. He traveled on a passport from the United Arab Emirates,
lived and studied in Germany, and then moved to Florida in the United
States.' Financing for the hijackers' activities in the United States may
have come through Swiss banks. 132 The victims who died in the attacks
were nationals from countries all around the globe. The grief and outrage
caused by the September 11 attacks have moved nations, including the
United States, to commit themselves with renewed energy and a heightened
sense of urgency to work cooperatively in disrupting terrorist networks
and bringing to justice those responsible for such terrible losses of life.
Coinciding with the growth in international crime has been the
transformation in international law also previously mentioned in this article.
The legal positivism that defined international law through the turn of the
twentieth century has given way to a more communitarian view of interna-
tional legal relations, including a recognition by governments that individu-
als are proper subjects of international law, with human rights that must be
protected. The succession of multinational human rights agreements,
drafted and ratified shortly after World War II, evidence this change in per-
spective. Language in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter of 1945,
127 Id.
128 John Miller, Frontline: Hunting Osama bin Laden: Who is bin Laden? availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Evan Thomas and Mark Hosenball, Bush: "We're At War", NEWSWEEK, Sept.
24, 2001, at 31.
132 Id. at 30.
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for example, articulates a commitment by U.N. members to "faith in funda-
mental human rights" and to the establishment of "conditions under which
justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties ... can be main-
tained."' 133 Specific human rights have been articulated in instruments such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 34 the Convention Against
Torture, 135 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 136 the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 137 and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. 138 Further, some agreements have created judicial bodies for interpre-
tation and enforcement of those individual rights. The United Nations
Charter, for example, established the International Court of Justice; 139 and
the European Convention established the European Court of Human
Rights. 140
The collision of increased transnational crime, particularly interna-
tional terrorism, with a steadily expanding commitment to enforcement of
human rights, has complicated the process of extradition. Treaties, execu-
tive acts and court decisions relating to this process all have been af-
fected. 141  As the human rights movement gains momentum, officials
involved in the enforcement of extradition treaties have come under grow-
ing pressure to consider international human rights norms in deciding
whether or not to grant a request to extradite a fugitive. That pressure has
been particularly sharp since 1999 when the Treaty of Amsterdam came
into force, explicitly incorporating the human rights standards set out in the
European Convention on Human Rights into European Union law.
142
Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), after its
amendment by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides that, "The Union shall
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
133 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
134 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 51.
135 Convention Against Torture, supra note 63.
136 ICCPR, supra note 20.
137 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OEA/
Ser.L.N/ll.71, at 17 (1988).
138 ECHR, supra note 19.
139 United Nations Charter, supra note 133, art. 7.
140 ECHR, supra note 19, art.19.
141 John Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with
Human Rights, 90 AM.J.INT'L.L. 187, 187 (1998).
142 Elizabeth Defeis, Human Rights and the E.U.: Who Decides: Possible Con-
flicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 301, 303 (2001).
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the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."' 14 3 The TEU
further requires the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights, whenever either court has jurisdiction, to apply these same
human rights standards to acts by the European Union (EU) institutions. 144
Consequently, it is increasingly common for a requested European nation to
be torn between honoring a bilateral extradition treaty and enforcing the
human rights standards of the European Convention of Human Rights. In
order to determine whether or not compliance with an extradition request
from a treaty partner will violate a fugitive's human rights, the requested
nation's judiciary more and more frequently is required to deviate from the
traditional rule of judicial non-inquiry and look beyond explicit extradition
treaty provisions to evaluate the substantive and procedural fairness of the
requesting nation's legal system. 145
Extradition controversies involving Jens Soering, 146 Pietro Vene-
zia,147 Ira Einhorn, 148 and in November, 2001, the arrest by Spanish authori-
ties of eight men believed to be connected with the September 11 attacks on
the Pentagon and New York, 149 all are examples of heated disputes among
the United States and European nations arising from the abrogation of the
rule of non-inquiry. The cases share important elements: the existence of a
bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and the country into
which an accused murderer has fled; a request by the United States for the
extradition of the fugitive; and the requested European state's refusal to
extradite because of human rights violations that it believed would occur
within the American legal system. More narrowly, the cases indicate a
trend toward a broadening of the bases on which foreign nations (including
but not limited to states which are party to the European Convention on
Human Rights) are refusing to comply with American extradition requests.
Viewed as functional inroads, the increasingly frequent decisions of the
United States Department of State and of the United States military not to
seek the death penalty as a condition of a European government's granting
an American extradition request appear to constitute a widening incursion
143 The Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam), O.J.
C 340/173, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 6(2).
144 Id., art. 46(d).
145 Semmelman, supra note 120, at 1213.
146 Soering v. United Kingdom, [1989] Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser.A., no. 161.
147 Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, Judgment No. 223, 79 Rivista di
Diritto Internazionale 815 (1996).
148 See infra text accompanying notes 171-181.
149 Sam Dillon with Donald G. McNeil Jr., Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions,
N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at Al
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into America's historic disregard for European opinion about the practice of
capital punishment.
150
IV. EVIDENCE OF WIDENING INROADS
A. Abrogation of the Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Death Penalty
Phenomenon: The Soering Case
One of the most important international extradition controversies
between the United States and a European state involved a German national
named Jens Soering, who murdered his girlfriend's parents in Virginia in
1985. Following the killing, Soering fled to the United Kingdom. When he
was arrested there for check fraud, a Virginia grand jury indicted him for
capital murder, and the United States sought his extradition in order that he
be tried for murder in the State of Virginia. 51
Great Britain has banned the death penalty for all but a very few
offenses. The ban is reflected in the U.S.-United Kingdom extradition
150 In a resolution adopted on January 24, 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe expressed its concern about threats to human rights resulting
from post-September 11 steps taken to combat terrorism. Combating Terrorism and
Respect for Human Rights, Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1271 (2002 Session-First Part). The
resolution called upon member states to align any counter-terrorism steps taken
with national and international law, and to respect human rights. Id. at para. 5. It
also called upon member states to refuse to extradite suspected terrorists if extradi-
tion would subject the defendants to execution upon conviction. Id. at para. 7.
Although the cases cited in this article are primarily within an American-
European context, the death penalty as a cause of extradition controversies has a
larger significance. Conflicts have been generated with other countries as well,
including neighboring countries such as Mexico and Canada; such conflicts also
exist among European states and their neighbors. See, e.g., Ginger Thompson, An
Execution in Texas Strains Ties with Mexico and Others, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2002, at A6; William A. Schabas, International Decision: United States v. Burns,
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (2001) (conflict between the United States and Canada);
Desmond Butler, Germany May Extradite Islamic Militant to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2002, at 9; Pascal Ceaux, La Justice Britannique Accuse la France de
Manipulation dans la Demande d'Extradition de Rachid Ramda, Le Monde, July 3,
2002, at 11 (an article from a French perspective about extradition and human
rights conflicts with the British judicial system). For a more extensive analysis of
world opinion of American death penalty practices, see Roger Hood, The Death
Penalty: The U.S.A. in World Perspective, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y. 517
(1997). See also Craig R. Roecks, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Pen-
alty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged with a Capital
Crime, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 189 (1994).
151 Henning, supra note 111, at 355-356.
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treaty which states, "If the offense for which extradition is requested is pun-
ishable by death under the relevant law of the requesting party, but the
relevant law of the requested party does not provide for the death penalty in
a similar case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting party gives
assurances satisfactory to the requested party that the death penalty will not
be carried out." 152 After receiving assurances from the State of Virginia that
Great Britain's wishes would be represented to the Virginia judge during
Soering's sentencing, Britain's Foreign Minister approved the extradition
request.153
However, Soering appealed Great Britain's decision to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECHR). He based his appeal on three argu-
ments, only one of which is relevant to this article. That argument was that
extradition would expose him to the "death row phenomenon," the mental
anguish that would result from prolonged uncertainty during the appeals
process combined with severe conditions of confinement.1 54 Soering ar-
gued that subjecting him to the death row phenomenon amounted to inhu-
man or degrading treatment, prohibited by Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 155 The ECHR held unanimously that there
would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if Great Britain en-
forced the extradition to Virginia, and allowed Great Britain to extradite
Soering to Germany, thereby sparing the British government from having to
choose between conflicting treaty obligations. 156
152 See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8,468, art. IV, which states, "If the offense for which extradition
is requested is punishable by death under the relevant law of the requesting Party,
but the relevant law of the requested Party does not provide for the death penalty in
a similar case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assur-
ances satisfactory to the requested party that the death penalty will not be carried
out."
153 Henning, supra note 111, at 357.
154 Soering, supra note 146, at 463.
155 ECHR, supra note 19, art. 3, which states, "No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
156 Soering, supra note 146. In August of 1989, despite the ruling of the ECHR,
the British and U.S. governments negotiated an agreement which allowed Mr.
Soering to be extradited to the U.S. for trial in Virginia, in exchange for the reduc-
tion of charges by the State of Virginia against Soering from capital to non-capital
murder, for which the death penalty could not be imposed. Because, according to
Mr. Douglas Hurd, England's Home Secretary, "no breach of the Convention
would arise if the possibility of a capital sentence were removed," the ruling of the
court was deemed no longer relevant to Soering's extradition. See John Carvel,
Britain and U.S. to Circumvent European Court Extradition Ban, GUARDIAN
190 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 9
However, the Soering decision set a precedent that has changed Eu-
ropean states' observance of the rule of non-inquiry. By allowing Soering
to argue the inhumanity of the death row phenomenon, the ECHR made it
necessary for Great Britain to investigate the truth of Soering's claims about
Virginia's penal system. In investigating the credibility of the death row
phenomenon, Great Britain went beyond the extradition treaty's terms of
what constituted exceptions to the obligation to extradite, and investigated
the quality of justice in the Virginia, thereby abandoning the rule of judicial
non-inquiry. Further, through its ruling that the U.K.'s observance of its
obligations under its bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S. would violate
an international human rights agreement, the Soering decision established
the precedent that the European Convention should take precedence over
extradition treaties because of the importance of protecting fundamental
human rights. 1
5 7
B. Sufficiency of Assurances: The Venezia Case
Italian national Pietro Venezia came to America in 1977, working
for several years as a waiter at local restaurants and eventually purchasing
his own restaurant. In 1988, Venezia was served with a notice from the
State of Florida informing him that his assets were frozen because of a
delinquent tax bill. Venezia tracked down David Bonham, the state tax
inspector who had notified Venezia that his assets were frozen, and shot
him to death. 158 Venezia subsequently fled the country; the U.S. govern-
ment immediately began an international search for him. In 1994, Italian
police arrested Venezia in Laterza, Italy. Venezia made a full, voluntary
confession, and the United States and Italy commenced extradition
proceedings. 159
In November of 1994, a local Italian court approved Venezia's ex-
tradition. Pursuant to the 1983 extradition treaty between the U.S. and It-
(London), Aug. 2, 1989. Soering was convicted in 1990 for the murders of his
girlfriend's parents, and was sentenced to two life terms in a Virginia prison. His
sentence has been upheld by both the Virginia Supreme Court and the 4th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Conviction of Diplomat's Son Upheld, WASH. POST,
July 1, 2000, at B2. See also Virginia Court Upholds Murder Convictions, WASH.
POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at D7.
157 Stephen C. Kiernan, Extradition of a Convicted Killer: The Ira Einhorn Case,
24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L. L. REv. 353 356-357 (2001).
158 DeWitt, supra note 123, at 566.
159 See id.
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aly, the Italian Justice minister reviewed the extradition request.1 60 Also
pursuant to the treaty, the Minister asked for assurances from U.S. officials
that the death penalty would not be imposed by the State of Florida. 161 Af-
ter the U.S. Department of Justice gave its assurances that the State of Flor-
ida would not seek capital punishment for Venezia, the Italian Justice
Minister finally approved Venezia's extradition to the United States in De-
cember of 1995.162 However, because of strong public and political pres-
sure, the extradition order was blocked by the ruling of a regional
administrative court in Italy, and Venezia's case was forwarded by that tri-
bunal to the Italian Constitutional Court. 163
The Constitution of Italy allows its citizens to be extradited only in
cases "expressly provided for in international conventions."' 164 The 1983
Extradition Treaty between Italy and the U.S. does not bar the extradition of
nationals. 165 However, Article 27 of the Italian Constitution guarantees an
absolute right to life by prohibiting the use of capital punishment. 166 There-
fore, where the death penalty was a possible punishment for a fugitive
sought by a foreign government, the Italian government, pursuant to the
treaty, was allowed to refuse to extradite if the requesting government did
not provide sufficient assurances that capital punishment would not be im-
160 Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, Italy-U.S., 35 U.S.T. 3023, T.I.A.S.
No.10,837, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1525 (1985) (entered into force Sept. 24, 1984).
161 Id., at 35 U.S.T. 3031, which provides that, "extradition shall be refused unless
the requesting Party provides such assurances as the requested Party considers suf-
ficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be
executed."
162 Dewitt, supra note 123, at 569.
163 Id.
164 ITALIAN CONSTITUTION, art. 26. See also Maslow, supra note 110, at 406.
165 Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, Italy-U.S., supra note 160. Article IX of the
treaty provides that when the offense for which extradition is requested is punisha-
ble by death under the laws of the requesting Party, extradition shall be refused,
unless the requesting Party provides such assurances as the requested Party consid-
ers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not
be executed. See also Maslow, supra note 110, at 407.
166 ITALIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, art. 27(4), which states, "Punishment
must not consist of measures contrary to humane precepts and shall aim at re-
forming the person upon whom sentence is passed. The death penalty is not admit-
ted save in cases specified by military laws in time of war." The death penalty was
also abolished in Italian military law by Article I of Act No. 589, Oct. 13, 1994.
See also Maslow, supra note 110, at 407.
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posed. After considering Venezia's appeal, the Italian Constitutional Court
blocked his extradition and ordered that Venezia be tried in Italy.1 67
The court based its opinions on two principal concerns, one of
which is particularly relevant to the issue of judicial non-inquiry. In its
ruling, the court seemed conflicted about the sufficiency of the U.S. govern-
ment's assurances with regard to the imposition of capital punishment on
Venezia. While the Constitutional Court ultimately wrote that it believed
that the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause would control the enforce-
ability of federal assurances in a Florida court, the judges also discussed
their concerns about an American state's autonomy in sentencing criminals.
Rather than resolving this conflict, the court, like the European Court of
Human Rights, decided Venezia's appeal on a different ground. The court
nullified the capital punishment provision of the U.S.- Italy extradition
treaty and an implementing Italian statute, interpreting the "sufficient assur-
ances" language in the extradition treaty provision and legislation as giving
the Justice Minister too much discretion to judge the reliability of a request-
ing state's assurances against the use of capital punishment. The discretion
in the treaty and statute, the court believed, was irreconcilable with the Ital-
ian Constitution's absolute protection of the right to life. 168
In ruling as it did, the Italian Constitutional Court reiterated its
opposition to capital punishment in the United States, and also implied a
concern about its faith in the assurances of the U.S. federal government.
Had the court believed that the federal government could, when requested
pursuant to a treaty to do so, give absolute assurances on behalf of an
American state (in this case, the State of Florida) that a requested fugitive
would not be sentenced to death, then the court's concerns about "unconsti-
tutional discretion" given to the Justice Minister by treaty and statute would
have been moot. It is true that the Venezia controversy gave the Constitu-
tional Court an opportunity to take strong, politically popular anti-death
penalty action by nullifying domestic law and part of an international agree-
ment which, in the court's view, did not protect absolutely the right to
life. 69 It is also true that the court's holding did not assert an explicit lack
of faith in the ability of the U.S. federal government to enforce its assur-
ances in a state court. However, the court could have interpreted the "suffi-
cient assurances" language to mean "absolute assurances," thereby
protecting the right to life of fugitives sought by the U.S. government while
avoiding the suggestion that the court did not have unequivocal faith in the
167 DeWitt, supra note 123, at 572.
168 Venezia, supra note 147.
169 See Dewitt, supra note 123, at 575.
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power of the U.S. government to enforce its guarantees. 170 In choosing not
to interpret "sufficient assurances" in favor of its international agreement
with the United States, the Italian Constitutional Court arguably expressed a
lack of faith in the power of the United States to honor its assurances to
Italy. In so doing, the Italian judiciary added a basis for the non-application
of the rule of judicial non-inquiry to that established by Soering.
C. Procedural Due Process and Human Rights: the Einhorn Case
In 1977, "hippie guru" Ira Einhorn murdered his girlfriend, Holly
Maddux, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1981, just before his trial began,
he fled to Ireland. For the next sixteen years, living under an assumed
name, he evaded capture. In the meantime, Einhorn was tried and con-
victed in absentia for Maddux's murder, under a Pennsylvania statute al-
lowing such proceedings. Subsequent to the conviction, the Philadelphia
District Attorney's office continued to search for Einhorn. In 1997, Ein-
horn was finally arrested in Mallon, France. 171
The ensuing extradition proceeding proved to be extraordinarily
frustrating for the United States. Ira Einhorn hired Dominique Tricaud, a
French attorney, to represent him. Tricaud argued successfully to the
French Appeals Court that Einhorn's Pennsylvania trial and conviction in
absentia violated principles of the European Convention of Human Rights,
and also ran contrary to French domestic law, which guarantees a new trial
after capture for a suspect convicted in absentia.72 Although the French
prosecutor argued that the trial in absentia should not be considered in the
United States' extradition request, the court did consider Einhorn's in ab-
sentia conviction and decided to deny the U.S.'s request, the procedural
consequence of which was that Einhorn went free. 173 (The court issued its
decision without explanation or comment, unlike Einhorn's lawyer, who
left the courtroom and said to reporters, "The United States has learned
today to its distress that it still has lessons to learn from old Europe in
matters of human rights.") 174
Hoping to cure the French judiciary's objection to Einhorn's extra-
dition, the Pennsylvania legislature promptly amended its trial in absentia
statute to allow for new trials ("under certain circumstances"!) for persons
170 Id. at 578.
171 Henning, supra note 111, at 370.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id., at 347.
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sentenced in absentia.175 A second arrest by French police, and a renewed
request for Einhorn's extradition, followed. At his extradition hearing in
Bordeaux, Einhorn's attorneys attempted to have the court block this sec-
ond request, arguing that the "Einhorn Amendment" (the Pennsylvania rule
granting a second trial for a narrow set of persons convicted in absentia)
was invalid.176 Einhorn's attorneys also argued that, regardless of the po-
tential invalidity of the amended Pennsylvania law, if Einhom were tried
and convicted under it he could receive a sentence of death.177 Pursuant to
the terms of its extradition treaty with France, the United States made assur-
ances to the French government that Pennsylvania would not seek to have
Einhorn executed should he be convicted, and the extradition order was
finally carried out. 178
The United States' extradition treaty with France does not bar ex-
tradition to a requesting country when the requesting country has tried and
convicted the fugitive in absentia; in fact, the treaty does not mention the
matter at all. 179 Article 8 of the treaty does bar extradition when the person
sought has been finally convicted in the requested state for the offense for
which extradition is requested. 180 Article 7 of the treaty states that the re-
quested state may refuse to extradite a suspect when capital punishment is a
sentencing option in the requesting state.'81 However, Ira Einhorn had not
been convicted of murder in France; and even had he been, that was the not
the basis for the French Appeals Court's blocking his extradition. Nor, ini-
tially, did the Court of Appeals focus on the fact that capital punishment is a
sentencing option for murder in Pennsylvania. It was not until the later
stages of the Einhorn controversy that the French judiciary's basis for
blocking Einhorn's extradition became a term of the extradition treaty itself
175 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(c) (2002). For the relevant rule before its amendment, see
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1100, Rule 1117(a) (1968).
176 Henning, supra note 111, at 372.
177 Id.
178 Extradition Treaty, Apr. 23, 1996, United States-France, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-13, 1996 WL 905553 (1996), art. 7. Art. 7(1) permits denial of an extradition
request for an offense punishable by death in the Requesting State but not in the
Requested State, unless the Requesting State provides the assurance that the death
penalty will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be carried out. Article 7(2)
declares that the death penalty, if imposed by the courts of the Requesting State,
shall not be carried out in instances when a Requesting State has provided an assur-
ance in accordance with Article 7(1).
179 Extradition Treaty, United States-France, supra note 178.
180 Id. art. 8(8).
181 Id. art. 7(1).
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(that of the possibility of capital punishment). At Einhorn' s first extradition
hearing the Appeals Court chose to consider the question not addressed in
the treaty, that being whether or not Einhorn's due process rights had been
violated by a trial in absentia; and, at his second hearing, the court inquired
into the legality of the ad hoc Pennsylvania legislation permitting Ira Ein-
horn to be tried a second time for Holly Maddux's murder. Thus the court
inquired, as did the courts which considered the Soering and Venezia cases,
into apparent violations of a fugitive's human rights. The French court in
the Einhorn matter indicated strongly that a human rights issue, arising
from a perceived procedural due process violation, should take precedence
over a bilateral extradition agreement.
D. The Tribunal Itself: Spain and Eight Islamic Extremists
After the September 11, 2001, the United States appealed to the
world community to cooperate in bringing to justice those responsible for
the terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York City. In Novem-
ber, after weeks of intense, international information-gathering and investi-
gation, Spanish authorities arrested eight Islamic extremists and charged
them with complicity in the World Trade Center bombings. 82 The United
States government has not yet formally requested of the Spanish govern-
ment that the eight extremists be extradited for trial; however, the topic has
been broached. As of early December, 2001, the Spanish government has
declined to assure the United States that the request will be honored. The
sticking point for the Spanish involves a new basis for non-application of
the rule of judicial non-inquiry into an American extradition request - the
nature of the tribunal before which the defendants' trials would be
conducted. 183
The tribunal that is the object of Spanish concern - more broadly,
the object of many European nations' officials' concern - is the military
commission established through a military order issued on November 13,
2001, by President George Bush. Some of the concerns of the Spanish gov-
ernment stem from section 4 of the order, which authorizes the imposition
of capital punishment on those defendants convicted by the commission.
Other concerns attach to the potentially secret nature of the proceedings, the
potential bias of the United States officers who would sit as "triers of both
fact and law"; and the preclusion by the order of any privilege of appeal by
182 Dillon & McNeil, supra note 149.
183 Id.
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a defendant to any state or federal court in the United States, or "to any
court of a foreign nation, or to any international tribunal." 184
President Bush's military commission implicates all of the issues
from which the extradition controversies previously described in this paper
stem. For example, the United States' executive branch is well aware of the
European Union's opposition to the use of capital punishment; the State
Department is aware as well that the EU has a policy of relieving member
states of the requirement to extradite, absent "believable assurances that the
death penalty will not be asked for or applied."' 85 Moreover, Spanish pros-
ecutors have warned American diplomats and a representative of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation that a military tribunal will not meet European
standards for judicial proceedings incorporated into Spanish law by the
Amsterdam Treaty. 186 Thus, rather than a single issue such as the death row
phenomenon or a due process concern, it is likely to be an entire institution
established by military order that will move the Spanish government to re-
fuse an American extradition request. 187
E. Military Jurisdictional Waivers: SOFA and Short
The same collision of human rights developments and interest in
criminal law enforcement is creating tension between U.S. military authori-
ties and host European nations' justice officials with regard to the use of
capital punishment by American military courts. Over the past ten years a
number of conflicts which parallel the civilian extradition conflicts de-
184 Id. See also Mil. Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 105. For consideration of
the political, security, and legal risks associated with different types of tribunals for
prosecution of September 11 defendants, see William Glaberson, U.S. Faces Tough
Choices if bin Laden is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at B5.
185 Dillon & McNeil, supra note 149.
186 Id.
187 In addition to resistance by the government of Spain to the extradition of al-
leged terrorists, the French and German governments have declined to provide evi-
dence of Zacarias Moussaoui's association with Al Qaeda, in light of the fact that
Moussaoui is charged with four capital offenses in connection with the September
11 attacks. For a brief examination of conflicts created by coexisting German and
French prohibitions on capital punishment, Council of Europe human rights obliga-
tions, and international cooperation in the prosecution of terrorism, see Steven
Erlanger, German Chancellor Hopes to Release Evidence Soon, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 2002, at A22. For conditions under which the German government has recently
agreed to provide evidence for use by the prosecution against Moussaoui, see
Christopher Marquis, Germany Agrees to Share Evidence Against 9/11 Defendant,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A18.
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scribed earlier in this article have arisen in important North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) member countries, like Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands. One case, Short v. Netherlands, 188 illustrates clearly the in-
roads being made in a military context into America's disregard for Euro-
pean opposition to the death penalty. Since 1949, the United States has
maintained military bases in a number of different European countries pur-
suant to its membership in NATO. The question of jurisdiction over Amer-
ican military personnel alleged to have committed criminal offenses in host
states has been addressed by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA)1 89 which regulates the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe and sets
out the procedures concerning exercise of criminal jurisdiction. 190 Under
the SOFA scheme, most criminal offenses allow for concurrent jurisdic-
tion, 19 1 in which cases each state (U.S. and host nation) may waive its re-
spective right to prosecute an offender and allow the other government to
assert jurisdiction over an accused. 192 Because of the United States mili-
tary's interest in trying its own personnel for alleged criminal offenses, 9 3
many NATO host states have negotiated bilateral agreements with the U.S.
generally to waive their jurisdictional rights, allowing the U.S. military to
prosecute its own personnel. 194
In March of 1988, U.S. Air Force Sergeant Charles Short, stationed
at a Netherlands air base, murdered his Turkish wife. 195 After his arrest by
188 Short v. Netherlands, No. 88/164 and 88/615 (District Court, the Hague, May 9,
1988). For a related, but more general analysis of international criminal jurisdic-
tion issues confronting the U.S. armed forces overseas (e.g., the military's lack of
jurisdiction over American family members and civilian workers, and the impact of
changing attitudes among U.S. allies with regard to S.O.F.A. criminal jurisdiction
concerns), see Mark E. Eichelman, International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for
the United States Military, 2000 Army Law 23 (2000).
189 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Sta-
tus of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2,846, 199
U.N.T.S. 67 (entered into force Aug. 23, 1953) [hereinafter NATO SOFA].
190 John E. Parkerson, Jr., & Carolyn S. Stoehr, The U.S. Military Death Penalty in
Europe: Threats from Recent Human Rights Developments, 129 ML. L. REv. 41,
45 (1990).
191 Id. at 46.
192 Id. at 47.
193 Id. at 49.
194 See, e.g., Agreement with Annex Between the United States of America and
The Netherlands regarding the Stationing of United States Armed Forces in The
Netherlands, Aug. 13, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 103, T.I.A.S. No. 3,174, 251 U.N.T.S. 91
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1954).
195 Short, supra note 188.
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U.S. military police, Short confessed to Dutch authorities. 196 The U.S. mili-
tary requested that the Dutch government waive jurisdiction over Sergeant
Short.197 The Dutch judge assigned to Short's case, explaining that a funda-
mental principle of Dutch law is that capital punishment should be avoided
to the extent possible, international treaty obligations notwithstanding, de-
clined to render Short to U.S. military police without a guarantee that any
death sentence imposed pursuant to a court martial would not be exe-
cuted. 9 8 U.S. authorities refused to make any such guarantee. 199 Absent
that promise, the Dutch government refused to surrender Short. Instead the
Dutch tried Short and convicted him of homicide, committing him to a
mental institution subsequent to a six-year prison sentence.200
Essentially, Short is the military analog to Einhorn and Venezia (al-
though with the interesting distinction that, instead of placing an interna-
tional human rights agreement over a bilateral extradition treaty, the Dutch
government subordinated an international agreement to its own domestic
human rights law). Short is further evidence that, notwithstanding a bilat-
eral extradition treaty or its military equivalent, European states bound by
international law or their own domestic concerns about capital punishment
will act in a way that forces the United States to align its practice function-
ally with European beliefs about the death penalty, or suffer frustration of
criminal justice objectives.
V. CONCLUSION
The research conducted for this article was provocative and troub-
ling. It showed a striking divergence between European and American re-
gard for provisions and principles of international human rights agreements.
It showed a shocking picture of the flaws in the United States' death penalty
schemes. And it showed that the traditional indicators of a democratic soci-
ety's will - case law, statutes, administrative policy - suggest that, at
least until very recently, European opinion about the death penalty mattered
not one iota to the United States government.
But the research showed two things more. First, in increasing num-
bers, case by case, the United States is agreeing not to impose the death
penalty on defendants in order to secure them from detaining European
states' jurisdictions. Second, the costs of ignoring European opinion are
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199 Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 190, at 59-60.
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